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Appellant Nga Ho respectfully submits her Reply Brief.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S NATURE OF THE CASE
Although Appellee claims it is a Nevada corporation and does business in
Wendover, Nevada, it conducted and continues to conduct substantial and continuous
business in Wendover, Utah and in the entire State of Utah.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
In its Course of Proceedings and elsewhere, it is inaccurate for Silver Smith to
state only interrogatories 8 and 9 sought jurisdictional facts and others did not.
Interrogatory #1 asked for names of the incorporators., date and place of business; #10
concerned other lawsuits, including parties' names, filing place, court case numbers
and disposition; #16 asked for other accidents, parties' names and addresses, and legal
proceedings relating thereto prior to this case; #17 asked for other accidents, parties'
names and addresses, and legal proceedings relating thereto subsequent to this case;
#19 asked for identities (address and phone numbers) of any party that might be
related to the case; #32 requested for identities, addresses of persons receiving notice,
reports, statement relating to the case; #41 asked for information on insurer and policy
custodians' names and addresses. (R. 93 - 106). Most, if not all, of these
interrogatories sought jurisdictional facts. Had Appellee honestly answered them, the
alter ego and others would have been exposed as one entity of unity of interest, their
common owners revealed as Utah residents, and named under John Does 1-10.

1

While admittedly not until after the Motion to Reconsider was decided that the
trial court entered the Order of Dismissal, Silver Smith did not file with the trial court
the Order of Dismissal at anytime prior the Motion to Reconsider was considered until
12/13/99, making it impossible for the court to sign and enter such order. (R. 172).
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tf 1 of Appellee is disputed which while Appellee purported itself as a Nevada
corporation which operated the casino in Wendover, Utah-Nevada border, it
conducted and continues to conduct substantial and continuous business in Utah. The
Court's judicial notice is respectfully directed to the common sense notion that a hotel
and casino could not conceivably carry on its business without an adjacent parking lot,
storage, or its common famous waving cowboy sign in Wendover, Utah, that
Wendover is on both sides of the border, that Salt Lake metropolitan area has the
nearest largest concentration of population targeted by the Appellee hotel and casino.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellee's first point of contention in the Summary Arguments and elsewhere
that certain exhibits in Appellant's brief should not be considered because "none" of
these items was submitted is inaccurate. While admittedly "none" of these items were
produced by Appellee, and thus not all were discovered despite Appellant's effort
before the trial court, they were attached to the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider and submitted to the court on the basis of proffer which was not objected
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to by Appellee. (R. 80, 39 - 40, 73, 125 - 127, 151, 155, 162 - 163).
Appellee's contention that its activities are not as extensive as those of the State
Line in Buddensick is challenged, fflf 3, 4, and 7 in Silver Smith's tenuous version of
facts address the key points raised by its leasing of the identical properties in
Wendover, Utah from the identical related entities State Line Hotel, Stateline
Properties, Inc. and Stateline Properties, Ltd. These same vague paragraphs of
Appellee are disputed by Appellant in that Silver Smith and State Line are alter ego of
each other. It cannot be over-emphasized that its activities and leasing properties in
Utah are directly related to the carrying on of its business in Nevada are an integral
part of the business in the sense that the hotel and casino could not conceivably
continue without an adjacent parking lot, storage, or advertisement in Utah.
Appellee's second point of contention in the Summary Arguments and
elsewhere that no specific jurisdiction lies is challenged by Appellant more fully later
and is briefly disputed here that Ho's injuries arose out of or were related to
Appellee's activities as enumerated in the Utah long arm statute; and as such it could,
would, and should have anticipated being haled into a Utah court. Indeed, Silver
Smith readily admits it "purposefully availed itself of purchasing advertising, services
and goods in Utah". (P. 26 of Appellee's Brief).
Appellee's last point of contention in its Summary Arguments and elsewhere
that it did not conceal directly adverse legal authority is inaccurate because Ho alleges
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its counsels concealed it. Appellee's argument that Buddensick is moot now because
the trial court considered it in the dismissal is challenged. Just because the trial court
may have considered does not mean this Court does not have the wisdom for review;
just because Appellee's counsels concealed Buddensick and its damaging
jurisdictional facts does not change the facts that they were and/or are adverse
evidence, nor can Appellee's ethical dilemma obstruct this Court's discretion to
examine the evidence in view of its alleged conduct. Further the trial court was
deprived by its tactics meaningful opportunity to resolve genuine issue as to material
jurisdictional facts in denying Ho's motion for discovery and request for oral
argument. Simply put, due to non-disclosure, the trial court couldn't, wouldn't, and
didn't rule on jurisdictional facts and the alter ago of State Line and Silver Smith.
Appellee's contention in its Summary Arguments and elsewhere that no general
jurisdiction lies because Ho pled only specific jurisdiction, sought no discovery on
jurisdiction or amendment of complaint must fail on its face. Contrary to the
contention, Ho pled both specific and general jurisdictions, based upon the undisputed
facts that Appellee was conducting enumerated activities in Utah (R. 2, 34 - 36, 85 87), sought to amend complaint, and discovery on jurisdiction (R.34 -36, 119, 128).
ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH COURTS HAVE GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER SILVER SMITH
4

It is not surprising that Silver Smith spends the bulk of its arguments in Point I
of its brief addressing the question of whether advertising activities are sufficient for
the Utah courts to exercise jurisdiction over this Nevada corporation. The cases cited
are admittedly mixed. Yet on our facts, we have far greater dealing between the Silver
Smith Casino & Resort and Utah entities than merely promotion. It leases several
parcels of land for parking lots, warehouse buildings, lodging facilities, R.V. Park in
Utah which even Appellee concedes are directly related, if not necessary, for its casino
and resort business. It contracts for essential goods and services in Utah beyond those
associated with promotion and advertising. It receives billion dollar profit through
revenue generated from Utah customers. And its officers and shareholders reside in
Utah. Taken cumulatively, these substantial and conlinuous business activities in
Utah are more than ample to confer Utah jurisdiction over it.
Silver Smith generally overlooks the preliminary question of whether our
circumstances warrant a review of the trial court decision. Silver Smith fails to
provide any valid reason why the Court should not exercise its judicial discretion and
grant Ms. Ho's appeal. The closest Silver Smith comes to satisfying this criteria is its
claim that this is an important question of state or federal law which has not been
settled, but should be settled by the Supreme Court. In fact, the Supreme Court of
Utah has repeatedly and often enumerated what will subject a foreign corporation to
the general jurisdiction of Utah courts.
5

All Utah appellate courts have long recognized that cases such as ours are
governed by the standard of whether the foreign corporation has engaged in
"substantial and continuous activity" within the forum state. The Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals then goes on the analyze whether the given facts meet this standard
consistent with due process. For Silver Smith to claim the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals has not decided this issue is ludicrous. Indeed, both sides cited in
their memoranda or briefs at least dozen recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court
or Court of Appeals on general jurisdiction questions.
Silver Smith tries to attack the "solicitation-plus" line of cases relied upon by
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.1 In doing so, Appellee again, as it
routinely did, asks the Court to overlook Silver Smith's other substantial, lengthy and
compelling activities conducted in the State of Utah. For instance, Appellee largely
ignores the number of parcels of property it leases in Utah which are directly related to
its casino and resort business. Silver Smith also wants to obscure the fact it runs R.V.
park and uses Utah attorneys to draft its contracts or numerous businesses who
provide other services or products needed to carry on its Nevada casino and resort
operations. Even though Appellee tries to claim its common control and ownership
relationship with Stateline and other Utah corporation Stateline Properties are not
determinative, by tactical concealment, it clearly reveals and supports a finding that

1

See primarily, McGriff v. Charles Antell Inc., 256 P.2d 703 (Utah 1953).
6

the foreign entity had a substantial and continuous presence in Utah.2
While the Court of Appeals unquestionably relied on McGriff s "solicitation
plus" analysis, Silver Smith's leasing of properties in Utah and its conducting of other
business in the state, standing alone, would likely have supported an exercise of
general jurisdiction. Possessing, leasing, or controlling property, maintaining agents
or bank accounts, R.V. park, having phone numbers, fax lines, post office numbers,
using attorneys and other service and good providers, litigating other lawsuits;
commonality of shareholders and stock ownership with sister corporations,
shareholders residing in this state represents substantial and continuous activity.
Silver Smith made tenuous arguments on federal due process questions above
in Point I. It tries to claim the Utah Court of Appeals's decision in Buddensick and or
this Court and the United States Supreme Court' decision to untouch the decision is
inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court authority. To the contrary, several U.S.
Supreme Court cases are offered as authority for Ms. Ho and will therefore be limited
to a discussion of an alleged conflict between the Utah Court of Appeals decision and
two United States Supreme Court cases, Helicopeteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.
v. Hall 466 U.S. 408 (1985); and Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342
2

The notion that a foreign corporation's advertising or solicitation of customers
in the forum state is important in assessing personal jurisdiction is also well settled in a
line of federal cases which were relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Buddensick v.
Stateline Hotel Inc., 972 P.2d 928, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) cert, denied, 982 P.2d
88 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct. 34 (1999).
7

U.S. 437 (1952).
It is worth noting that both cases relied upon by Silver Smith involve truly
foreign corporations, that is, non-U.S. companies. Geographical proximity is not
necessarily a factor expressly employed by the courts in resolving a general
jurisdiction case. Yet when one considers such issues as Defendant's expectations of
being sued in Utah or the foreseeability of causing injuries in Utah, having its
principle place of business in a border town certainly distinguishes Silver Smith from
the defendants in Helicopteros and Perkins. The United States Supreme Court has, on
at least one occasion, commented that due process concerns are heightened when
international defendants are involved. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987), the Court noted the "additional burdens" placed upon one
who must defend itself in a foreign legal system. Those "burdens" are not present and
do not raise due process issues here when the defendant maintains its principal place
of business on the forum state's border.
On close examination, both of the cited cases use an almost identical standard
as Utah's "substantial and continuous activity." The federal cases ask whether the
foreign corporation had "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with
the forum state. Helicopteros at 416. As discussed herein and earlier, Silver Smith's
business activities within the State of Utah are extensive or significant and lengthy or
systematic. Its business ties here extend uninterrupted back into time for some twenty

8

years and are not isolated visits to the forum such as were found insufficient to support
an exercise of jurisdiction in Helicopteros. Silver Smith's business activity within
Utah meets or exceeds that of the defendant in Perkins (where jurisdiction was found
proper), generally summarized as the principle stock holder of the foreign corporation
conducting business affairs from his residence in the forum state of Ohio. The nature
and level of Appellee's activities, most notably the leasing of property, also answers
any questions raised by Silver Smith as to whether the Buddensick decision meets
constitutional due process muster as well. Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals and this
Court decision are entirely consistent with United States Supreme Court opinions.
It just cannot be overemphasized that Silver Smith's most intense contacts are
its leasing and possession of property in Utah. On this point, Appellee states "Plaintiff
has not cited any authority for the proposition that a foreign defendant's leasing real
property in the forum state will result in the defendant's being haled into court for all
purposes." (Appellee's Brief @ page 23). But this is not to say that Appellee has
provided any authority leasing property does not support the assertion of jurisdiction,
and Appellant has not provided3 the authority or such authority does not exist.
Although it expressly construed issues arising from quasi in rem jurisdiction,
the case of Rhoades v. Wright 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980) is highly instructive in our
circumstances. Rhoades was a wrongful death action against a family of three

3

See Footnote #28 on Appellant's Opening Brief @ page 28. R. 32-34.
9

defendants who owned and farmed adjoining parcels of land on the Utah-Colorado
border. The murder giving rise to the action occurred on the Colorado property and
did not directly involve the defendants' business activities and ownership of land in
Utah. After dismissal of a federal district court case, plaintiff filed simultaneous
actions in Utah and Colorado state courts. The Colorado action was dismissed, the
statute of limitations having run. The defendants then moved for dismissal of the
Utah action based upon the absence of personal jurisdiction.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal. Although the
issues addressed in the opinion primarily involved constitutional due process
concerns, the importance the Court placed upon property possession in the forum state
is persuasive here. The Court found that presence of property alone in the forum state
could not support an exercise of jurisdiction, but that it can "suggest the existence of
other ties". Id. 346, citing Shaffer v. Heintner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
We consider the presence of defendant's land - decidedly
tangible and immovable - together with use of the land to be
sufficient contact by defendants with this state to support the
exercise of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ownership and use
of land hereby defendants provides that purposeful activity
related to the form that would make the exercise of
jurisdiction fair, just and reasonable.
Rhoades at 346 quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 320, 329 (1980).
The Rhoades Court noted that defendants' ownership and use of land in Utah
were acts by which they purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting
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activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.
Such ownership and use would also prompt defendants to reasonably believe they
would be haled before a Utah court. Rhodes at 347. The presence of a foreign
corporation's property in the forum state has long been a factor determining whether
an entity conducts business in the state. See Hill v. Zale, 482 P.2d 332 (Utah 1971).
Similarly, Silver Smith cannot honestly claim that it didn't reasonably
anticipate being hailed before a Utah court. It operates a casino and resort in
Wendover, a town that sits astride the Utah-Nevada border. It actively solicits Utah
residents who unquestionably provide the majority of its revenue. This is not simply a
case where the Plaintiff established a contact with Defendant, instead, Defendant
purposefully established "minimum contacts" with Utah, in the form of lease
agreements, R.V. park, advertising contracts, and the acquisition of other goods and
services from Utah residents. The Constitution would not whatsoever be offended by
an exercise of general jurisdiction over Silver Smith in our case. See, generally,
Burger King Corp. V. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Contrary to Appellee's tenuous claim, this Court has on numerous occasions
provided logical and consistent guidelines and examples of level of conduct and what
will or will not constitute "substantial and continuous activity" such that Utah courts
can constitutionally exercise general jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation. A
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significant and compelling list of such activities are present here: (1) advertising and
solicitation aimed at bringing Utah residents to Silver Smith's casino and resort in
Nevada;4 (2) leasing of and controlling several parcels of property in Utah directly
related to its casino and resort operations; (3) contracting with Utah attorneys or other
providers of services and goods in Utah; (4) litigating other lawsuits in the State; (5)
maintaining phone, fax lines, post office numbers, agents or bank accounts; (6)
owning stock in Utah corporations; and (7) having its shareholders reside in Utah.
Silver Smith's tenuous contention that certain exhibits of Appellant's brief
should not be considered because "none" of these was submitted to the trial court is
misleading. Though an issue raised for first time on appeal are usually not considered,
courts will consider an issue where (a) it was submitted to trial court, (b) plain error
occurred affecting substantial rights, (c) exceptional or unusual circumstance is
demonstrated, or (d) liberty interest is jeopardized. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359
(Utah App.1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-3 (Utah App. 1991);
Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 744 P.2d 895, 896 (Mont. 1987).
First, "review is not precluded in this case, where the notice for discovery and
inspection at issue can be adequately evaluated from the record on appeal... To hold
otherwise would be to exalt form over substance." Ensign Bank v. Gerald Modell

4

Advertising in the forum state constitutes an activity subjecting a foreign
corporation to jurisdiction. Parry v. Ernest Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 666 (Utah
1989).
12

Inc., 557 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). While admittedly "none" of
certain exhibits were produced by Appellee, and thus not all were discovered despite
Appellant's good faith effort before the trial court, they were attached and submitted
to the trial court on the basis of proffer which were not objected to by Appellee. (R.
80, 39 - 40, 73, 125 - 127, 151, 155, 162 - 163).
Second, "where there could be no reasonable difference of opinion on these
questions in light of the available evidence, the decision is one of law", AMS Salt
Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997), and the
trial court committed plain error by denying Appellant's motion for discovery aimed at
jurisdictional facts per Buddensick. (R. 84 - 85, 91, 119). The error was basic,
serious, and fundamental in character that it deprived Ms. Ho's constitutional
substantial rights in having her case heard on the merits in a Utah court and clearly
prejudiced substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the Utah
judicial administration. Third, Silver Smith's counsels hiding the directly adverse
authority and jurisdictional evidences therein demonstrates exceptional or unusual
circumstance. Lastly, the underlying mental anguish and physical injuries jeopardized
Ho's liberty interest whereby her health condition are deprived and adversely affected.
Because Appellee purposely availed itself in the gambling business and
continues to avail itself of the Utah benefits and protection, it should expect to be
haled into Utah courts for its obligations raising identical jurisdictional issues. In this
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aspect, the Court "reserves to itself the power to examine ... issues that involve broad
public concerns to avoid future litigation on a point of law." Cottrill at 896. The level
of activities of Silver Smith coupled with its unusual conduct of concealment of the
Buddensick, is more than sufficient under and entirely consistent with Utah, U.S. case
law and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. To say that it lacks
continuous and systemic contacts with Utah is quite simply erroneous. The lower
court should have found that the criteria for exercising general jurisdiction were met.
II.
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES DIRECTLY AROSE OUT OF
DEFENDANT'S CONTACTS WITH UTAH AND, THEREFORE,
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION EXISTS
Arguments made in Point II of Appellee's Brief ask the Court to loose sight of
the underlying principle guiding decisions under Utah's long arm statute, codified at
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 to 28. Specifically, § 78-27-22 states legislative policy
and intent in declaring that the statute "should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction
over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause,
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." See also, Abbott G.M.
Diesel Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978). As Appellee correctly
observes, Plaintiff here relies primarily on the fact she was lured to its casino and
resort by an extensive and aggressive advertising campaign in Utah. In order for the
Court to assert specific personal jurisdiction over this Defendant, Ms. Ho must
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admittedly show her injury arose from Silver Smith's forum contacts. Secondly, the
exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with constitutional due process concerns.
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992). These
two issues will be addressed in the order set by Appellee in its brief.
In answering the question of whether an exercise of jurisdiction in our
circumstances would offend traditional due process concerns, the Court's attention is
once again directed to Rhoades, supra. There, where a tort occurred in Colorado by
Colorado defendants who owned adjoining properties in the two states against a Utah
resident, the Utah Supreme Court found due process would not be offended by an
exercise of jurisdiction. More specifically, the Court found the non-resident could
"reasonably anticipate being summoned into Utah court" and that Utah had an
overriding interest to ensure the compensation of its residents for such injuries.
Finally, the convenience of the parties in our facts would indeed be served by
permitting the action to proceed in Utah in that most witnesses, including the treating
doctors and many of Defendants' employees, reside in Utah. It is the close proximity
of its Utah and Nevada operations (again, similar to Rhoades and identical to
Buddensick), which distinguish our case from those occasional opinions where the
Utah Courts have found an absence of specific jurisdiction. See Arguello and Parry.
The question then becomes whether Plaintiffs injuries arose from Defendant's
contacts with the forum state. While the relationship between the cause of action and
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the contact is not as direct or proximate as, for instance, suing on a contract negotiated
in Utah between a resident and non-resident, nonetheless, the relationship is here
adequate to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.5

The Utah courts

have not required a precise identity of the cause of action to the contract. Instead, the
more closely related the contacts are to the cause of action, the fewer contacts which
are necessary to establish jurisdiction. Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandse,
884 P.2d 1299 (Utah App. 1994).
Nga Ho reasonably believes that Silver Smith's promotional and advertising
activities in Utah constitute a direct relationship to her cause of action warranting the
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. In support of that proposition a number of
cases were cited to the court which Appellee argues were vacated or overruled. While
true to some extent, not a single one of the subsequent decision s rejected the
underlying proposition that advertising and promotional activities in the forum state
could support an exercise of jurisdiction. As previously explained, for example, in
Alexander v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 972 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1991), the reversal
was based upon contradictions in affidavits which appeared after issuance of the
opinions relied upon by Ms. Ho. The Alexander opinion/order did not, whatsoever,
retract or even discuss the findings relied upon by Appellant. Similarly, in Carnival
Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), the Supreme Court relied exclusively

5

Radcliffe v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah App. 1994)
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on a forum selection clause in the parties contract/passenger ticket to overrule the 9th
Circuit opinion as to personal jurisdiction.
In State ex rel. Circus Circus Reno v. Pope, 854 P.2d 461 (Ore. 1993), the
Court rejected a "but-for"test in ruling that the forum state did not have jurisdiction
over a non-resident hotel for a personal injury claim which occurred on its property.
There, Circus Circus had no "real estate, employees, or exclusive agents in the state",
but merely advertised in Oregon and maintained a toll-free number for use of its
residents. Id. at 462. By contrast, Silver Smith has employees, shareholders, and or
owners residing in Utah, possesses real and or otherwise manages parking lots, storage
facilities, R.V. Park inside Utah, and makes contracts with businesses in Utah.
As such, Silver Smith's activities in the forum state are indeed "substantial"
and not simply "isolated" as the Court found with respect to the hotel in Circus Circus.
The substantial level of Silver Smith's activities in Utah as discussed above also
distinguishes our facts from other cases relied upon by Appellee, including Munley v.
Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1988), and Wims v. Beach Terrace
Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
The issue of whether Nga Ho's cause of action is directly and intimately related
to Silver Smith's forum contacts is far more complex than Appellee suggests. It asks
the Court to ignore and overlook the shareholders and employees' residence in Utah,
the contracts, leases, RV park, and advertising contracts Silver Smith has with Utah.
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Its argument also fails to recognize the unique situation presented by a casino and
resort situated in a Utah-Nevada border town which attracts the bulk of its business
from Utah customers, including Appellant. When Silver Smith's unique
circumstances and relationship with the forum state are considered, it is easy to
establish a sufficiently direct relationship between Nga Ho's cause of action and the
forum state to justify conferring specific personal jurisdiction.
III.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE BUDDENSICK OPINION WAS
CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT MOOT AND
SILVER SMITH'S ARGUMENTS IN THIS REGARD FAIL
Silver Smith's argument fails for a number of obvious reasons; the fallacy of its
arguments will be addressed in the order set by Appellee. First, it is not surprising
that Appellee spends the bulk of its remaining argument addressing whether the
Buddensick opinion was considered by trial court is moot rather than addressing other
more dispositive issues. The issues are admittedly mixed. But, on our facts, we have
far greater unique and exceptional circumstances than merely whether the trial court
considered and or applied the Buddensick opinion correctly. While admittedly not
until after the Motion to Reconsider was decided that the trial court entered the Order
of Dismissal, Silver Smith was responsible for the neglect because it did not file with
the trial court the Order of Dismissal at anytime prior to the Motion to Reconsider was
denied until 12/13/99, making it impractical for the trial court to sign and enter such
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order. (R. 172). In this regards, Appellee cannot reasonably bolster its claim that the
trial court had more than an adequate opportunity to consider the Buddensick opinion.
In our case, even if assuming arguendo the trial court may have been made
aware of Buddensick, it did not properly consider and/or apply the precedent to Ms.
Ho's case and whose decision is entirely subject to review for correctness. The Order
of Dismissal made no mention of Buddensick being considered, which indicated the
trial court overlooked it. In any event, as a direct result of Appellee's tactical nondisclosure, the trial court was deprived of the needed opportunity to adjudicate the
Appellee's alter ego, its true and overwhelming contacts with Utah; further the trial
court did not grant oral arguments or an opportunity to seek jurisdictional facts. More
importantly, Appellee's counsels concealed directly adverse legal authority from the
trial court and opposing counsel. It evaded propounded discovery interrogatories and
requests on jurisdictional facts. It also withheld prejudicial evidences of exclusive and
common control and ownership between Silver Smith and Stateline casinos.
Taken cumulatively, the unique and unusual circumstance of our case, the
outrageous scheme and unusual conducts of Appellee are more than ample to find the
issue of whether the trial court considered Buddensick and or the whether Appellee's
concealment of directly adverse authority is not moot. Though Silver Smith tries to
paint the issue differently, it cannot change the more significant fact that it concealed
the directly adverse legal authority, and by its doing, the trial court and Appellant were
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deprived the meaningful opportunity to know its factual and extensive jurisdictional
contacts with Utah, including but not limited to its alter ego with Stateline Hotel. In
this regard it is not irrelevant whether the trial court considered Buddensick.
Second, Silver Smith tries to claim its counsels are exempted from being candid
toward the tribunal by quibbling it is "unaware of any ... Utah authority [and] cases
from other jurisdictions and the notes of the American Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics ... are not binding on this Court or Utah Lawyers." (Appellee
Brief, p. 33). It is note worthy that Appellee quoted eight cases below and six cases
from other jurisdictions in its brief. Not only the Scope to the Rules of Professional
Conduct provides the "Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text
of each Rule is authoritative", our Utah Supreme Court has ruled that,
[a]lthough we have had no occasion to interpret the canon at
issue, the Ethics Advisory Committee of the Utah State Bar
has addressed it in an informal opinion. See Utah State Bar
Ethics Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 90-3 (1990)... In
addition, the ABA Advisory Committee ... and a number of
courts in other jurisdictions have ... based on rules and
statutes derived from the Model Code and similar to canon 3
of the U.C.J.C.... We look to these sources for guidance in
this case.
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert 830 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1992). Guidance is
synonymous with commandment, disposition, or order. A "plain meaning of the
words used in the statute as a whole is the paramount index of congressional intent."
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). Prima facie reading from Utah
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and our sister jurisdictions requires Appellee's counsel to disclose Buddensick under
Rule 3.3(a)(3). Silver Smith may try but it cannot honestly deny "directly adverse
authority" simply means "unfavorable to an advocate's position." Black Law's
Dictionary, 7th Ed., p.128 (1999).
Though the issue of non-disclosure may be of first impression in the state, the
manner in which it is handled is well established across the nation. Utah courts have
traditionally looked to other jurisdictions, federal decisions, and the ABA opinions in
construing and establishing its own rules. See Unitah Oil Refining Co. v. Continental
Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495 (Utah 1964); Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 252 P.2d 205,
207 (Utah 1953). For example, behind the comment following the text of Rule 3.3
Candor to the Tribunal lies a Model Code Comparison or counterpart to Utah rule
wherein Rule 3.3(a)(3) is substantially identical to DR 7-106(B)(l). See Rule 11 and
Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959 (1991). Also, the Buddensick Court
distilled a set of relevant factors only after it surveyed the vast array of cases across the
nation. As set forth in Ms. Ho's brief (pp. 33 - 35), these guidelines on nondisclosure issue are compelling instructive to this instant appeal.
Appellee correctly says each case must be viewed factually. Yet in examining
the facts occurring in Utah in our case to that of Buddensick, the facts speak for
themselves: (1) Appellee engages in business activities; (2) it via agents is licensed to
do run RV park; (3) it leases or controls storage facilities and parking lots; (4) it
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maintains agents, offices, agent, bank accounts; (5) its shareholders' residence; (6) it
maintains phone, fax and P.O. box address; (7) it advertises or solicits for business; (8)
it contracts for goods and services with Utah entities; (8) it litigates other lawsuits; (9)
it pays property and possibly income taxes for rent and bank accounts; (10) its
principal business sits on the Utah-Nevada border; (11) it employs Utah residents and
employees residing in Utah; (12) it gouges billion dollar profit revenue from Utahns.
To the extent that Silver Smith here and Stateline therein Buddensick are alter
ego of each other, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, res judicata, law of the case, and
or doctrine of the law uniformly apply. Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632
(Utah 1995). Contrary to what it would have the Court believe, Buddensick does
stand for the proposition that Utah courts have general jurisdiction over all nonresident corporations possessing similar qualities and status in similar circumstances.
As discussed herein and in Appellant Brief (pp. 10 - 13), Stateline in Buddensick and
Silver Smith in this case are counterpart, alter ego of each other (Appellant Brief,
Footnote 5, 6, p. 11, R. 162 -163) with strikingly similar, if not identical,
circumstance. The ruling as to the defendant casino in Buddensick applies directly to
Silver Smith. Stateline Hotel in Buddensick and Silver Smith Casino in this case
share a remarkable list of numerous identical contacts, and the nature and extent of
their respective contacts were and are equally evasive. (R. 19, 72 - 73, 116 - 119, 162
- 163 Appellant Brief, pp. 10 - 13, 19 - 23). The Court's attention is respectfully
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directed to the evidences in the exhibits. Therefore, the Buddensick ruling squarely
settles the jurisdictional issue in this case.
Third, while the trial court may have been briefed of some legal factors, neither
the trial court nor Ms. Ho knew of Silver Smith's non-disclosure of the Buddensick
opinion and its alter ego with Stateline. By concealing the Buddensick opinion, Silver
Smith withheld incriminating jurisdictional facts; had it been disclosed, Ho would
have reasonably defeated the motion to dismiss. For example, the trial court and Ho
was un-informed as to Stateline and Silver Smith' identical owners residing in Utah,
R.V. park in Utah. As set forth above, Appellee evaded Ho's propounded discovery
on these jurisdictional issues. (R. 93 - 106). These interrogatories sought
jurisdictional facts and had Appellee honestly answered, the alter ego, the exclusive
common ownership and control would have been exposed; Stateline would have
supplemented John Does 1-10.
To smokescreen the dreadful concealment on jurisdictional facts, Appellee
represented that such factors as minimally disclosed were "irrelevant" and should not
be considered at one time (R. 54) and then represented such "relevant" factors were
made known to the trial court at another time (R. 134). Appellee resumes to its old
tactics here by partially citing the Comment to Rule 3.3(a)(3) under heading
Misleading Legal Argument. The full text provides,
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of
law constitutes dishonesty toward a tribunal. A lawyer is not
23

required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but
must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities.
Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a
duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling
jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the opposing
party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a
discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly
applicable to the case.
So long as Silver Smith concealed its jurisdictional activities in Utah, such as
common ownership and control with Stateline, shareholders residing in Utah, R.V.
park in Utah, litigating other lawsuits in Utah, etc. the legal premises were not
properly, in this case improperly, applicable to the case. The trial court would not,
could not and did not know about Silver Smith's true alter ego with Stateline to make
an informed and proper determination. By only a glimpse of the half truth, the trial
court was deprived of the necessary meaningful opportunity to adjudicate the
jurisdictional activities of Silver Smith in Utah, and could not practically apply a
misrepresented bundle of facts to an incomplete set of legal standards.
Fourth, Appellee erroneously contends no general jurisdiction lies because Ms.
Ho pled only specific jurisdiction, did not seek to amend her complaint or seek
discovery on jurisdiction. Appellant alleged both specific and general jurisdictions,
entirely based upon the undisputed facts that Appellee was conducting enumerated
activities in Utah (R. 2, 27 - 28, 34 - 36, 85 - 87), sought to amend her complaint,
(R.34 -36), and sought discovery on competent jurisdictional facts. (R. 119, 128).
Lastly, again to smokescreen the seriousness of hiding jurisdictional facts
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relating to the directly adverse authority of Buddensick, Appellee tries to shift the
blame elsewhere. The law sanctions against fraud and prohibits a plea of contributory
negligence to a willful wrong. Johnson v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah 1945).
Appellee should not be allowed to employ the gullibility defense against fraud. (R.
116-119, 140, 146-148).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Nga Ho respectfully urges this Court to reverse Judge
Henriod's dismissal, and permit the case to proceed on its substitute merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <&?day of June, 2000.
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